Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, Respondents
Decided March 26, 2010
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) Whether an alien has presented sufficient evidence to establish a well-founded fear
of persecution is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo by the Board
of Immigration Appeals.
(2) In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient
to meet a legal standard such as a “well-founded fear,” the Board has authority to give
different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge.
(3) State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and
are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.
(4) The evidence presented by the respondents, considered in light of State Department
country reports specific to Fujian Province, failed to establish a reasonable possibility
that either respondent would be subject to forced sterilization due to having two children
born in the United States or would face penalties or sanctions so severe that they would
rise to the level of persecution.
FOR RESPONDENT: Richard Tarzia, Esquire, Belle Mead, New Jersey
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Michael Horowitz, Assistant
BEFORE: Board Panel: GRANT, MILLER, and MALPHRUS, Board Members.
MILLER, Board Member:
In a decision dated February 12, 2008, an Immigration Judge found the
respondents removable on their own admissions and granted their application
for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (2006). The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed
from that decision. The DHS’s appeal will be sustained, the decision of theCite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
1 The respondents’ motion to summarily dismiss the DHS’s appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) (2010) is denied. The DHS provided a lengthy statement with the
Notice of Appeal identifying the factual and legal bases for the appeal in detail.
Furthermore, the DHS filed a timely brief in support of the appeal.
2 The respondents’ claim is based on the female respondent’s application for relief, and
we therefore refer to her when we reference a single respondent. She submitted her
asylum application on November 13, 2006. Because the application was filed after May 11,
2005, it is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L.
No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (enacted May 11, 2005). See Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec.
42 (BIA 2006). The amendments made by the REAL ID Act to section 208(b)(1)(B) of the
Act therefore apply to this case.
Immigration Judge will be vacated, and the respondents will be ordered
removed from the United States.1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The respondents, who are husband and wife, are natives and citizens
of China. They have two United States citizen children, a son born
in November 2003 and daughter born in March 2007. The respondents do not
claim to have suffered past persecution, or even to have been threatened with
persecution in China. However, the female respondent asserts that if she
is returned to China, and particularly to Huang Qi Town, Lian Jiang County,
in Fujian Province, she has a well-founded fear of persecution as a result of the
birth of her two children in the United States.2
In a hearing before the Immigration Judge, the respondent testified that
if she is removed to China, she would be forcibly sterilized and fined
by Chinese Government officials because she has two children. In support
of her asylum application, the respondent submitted an affidavit from her
mother. The respondent’s mother stated that upon her inquiry to the family
planning office of Huang Qi Town, she was informed that if a Chinese national
violates the regulation requiring the insertion of an intrauterine device (“IUD”)
after the first birth and sterilization after the second birth and then returns to
China, she will definitely be sterilized and fined 20,000 yuan. The respondent
also included statements from friends and other relatives attesting to this
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent was a credible witness
and determined that she had established that the family planning authorities
who would have jurisdiction over her, i.e., the family planning authorities
of Huang Qi Town, located in Lian Jiang County, Fujian Province, would
force her to be sterilized and impose a significant fine on her. The
Immigration Judge therefore granted the respondent’s application for asylum.Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
Having granted asylum, the Immigration Judge did not address the
respondent’s requests for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006), and protection under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
39/46. 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984)
(entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988).
Section 101(a)(42) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), includes
within the definition of a “refugee” a person who has a well-founded fear
that he or she will be forced to undergo involuntary sterilization or will
be subject to persecution for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure
or for resistance to a coercive population control program. The DHS
challenges the Immigration Judge’s determination that a reasonable person
in the respondent’s circumstances would fear being subjected to a forced
sterilization or sanctions rising to the level of persecution upon her return
We review the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact, including those
relating to credibility, to determine whether they are “clearly erroneous.”
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2010). We review de novo all other questions
of law, discretion, and judgment, including the question whether the parties
have met the relevant burden of proof. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
The Immigration Judge’s favorable credibility determination is not “clearly
erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). However, it remains the respondent’s
burden to establish that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear
being subjected to a forced sterilization or sanctions rising to the level
of persecution upon her return to China. See Yong Hao Chen v. U.S. INS, 195
F.3d 198, 204 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the alien’s fear of persecution based
on China’s population control policy was not objectively reasonable, because
the underlying basis for his fear was “membership in a diffuse class against
whom actual persecution” was rare and he failed to show that he and his wife
would be individually targeted). Regardless of the policy generally prohibiting
the birth of additional children following the birth of a son, to be eligible for
relief the respondent must also meet her burden of demonstrating a reasonable
possibility that Chinese Government officials would enforce the family
planning policy against her through means constituting persecution. See Jian
Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no legal
error in the Board’s three-part inquiry requiring the alien to identify
a governmental policy implicated by the births at issue, establish that
Chinese Government officials would view the births as a violation of theCite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
3 As we observed in Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. at 496-97, the Attorney General
provided specific examples to explain the Board’s scope of review in the Supplementary
Information to the 2002 procedural reform regulations. See Board of Immigration Appeals:
Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,890 (Aug. 26,
2002) (Supplementary Information). Relying on these examples, we noted that “the
Immigration Judge’s assessment of what happened to an asylum applicant is a factual
determination that will be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard,” while the issue
“whether the facts demonstrate harm that rises to the level of persecution” is a question that
“‘will not be limited by the “clearly erroneous” standard.’” Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec.
at 496-97 (quoting 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,890 (Supplementary Information)).
policy, and demonstrate a reasonable possibility that such officials would
enforce the policy against the alien through means constituting persecution);
Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007); Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N
Dec. 185 (BIA 2007).
While the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact are reviewed under
the “clearly erroneous” standard, the question whether the facts are
sufficient to establish that the respondent has a well-founded fear
of persecution upon return to China is a legal determination that we review de
novo. Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500, 501-02 (BIA 2008); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3); see also, e.g., Cubillos v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1054, 1058-89 (8th
Cir. 2009). Determining whether a fear of what may happen in the
future is well founded essentially involves predicting future events, and
“it is impossible to declare as ‘fact’ things that have not yet occurred.” Matter
of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 498 (BIA 2008).3
We therefore review de novo
the question whether the respondent has carried her burden of establishing
a well-founded fear that the family planning policy will be enforced against
her through means constituting persecution upon her return to China.
In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are
sufficient to meet a legal standard such as a “well-founded fear,” the Board has
authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the
Immigration Judge. Id. at 497; see also Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68,
72 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that the regulation prohibiting the Board from
engaging in fact-finding does not “restrict the BIA’s powers of review,
including its power to weigh and evaluate evidence introduced before the IJ”).
This authority is critical to permit the Board to determine whether the facts
as found by the Immigration Judge meet the relevant legal standard, including
circumstances where anecdotal and subjective evidence is presented
to undercut more recent evidence from more established and reliable sources.
See Matter of C-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 899, 903 (BIA 2006) (holding that the State
Department documents on country conditions warranted greater weight than
an affidavit from an expert witness that was not based on first-hand experienceCite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
4 Any other rule would not be consistent with the Attorney General’s conclusion that “the
Board is better positioned to resolve issues involving the application of legal standards and
the exercise of discretion.” Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. at 496 (citing 67 Fed. Reg.
at 54,890 (Supplementary Information)). Furthermore, it would greatly restrict the Board’s
ability to review various legal determinations initially made by Immigration Judges, such
as whether an Immigration Judge properly found that an applicant failed to present sufficient
or persuasive evidence to establish a claim of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)
(2006). See Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631, 636 n.6 (4th Cir. 2008); see also 67 Fed. Reg.
at 54,890 (Supplementary Information).
and relied on more dated information about Chinese population control
policies). This review authority also promotes consistency in the application
of legal standards so that cases with similar facts are generally decided
in a like manner.4
State Department reports on country conditions, including the Profiles
of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions, are highly probative evidence and
are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2006);
Gonahasa v. U.S. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 1999); Matter of V-T-S-,
21 I&N Dec. 792, 799 (BIA 1997). The reports are accorded “special weight,”
Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F3d. 701,705 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010), because they
are based on the collective expertise and experience of the Department
of State, which “‘has diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the
world.’” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d at 341 (quoting
Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976)). However, this evidence
does not “automatically discredit contrary evidence presented by the
applicant,” and it is critical to also consider and evaluate “‘any contrary
or countervailing evidence . . . as well as the particular circumstances of the
applicant’s case.’” Alibasic v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 78, 87 n.6 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also,
e.g., Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 2002).
We have considered the State Department documents on country conditions
along with the particularized evidence presented by the applicant and conclude
that the respondent has not carried her burden of establishing a well-founded
fear that the family planning policy will be enforced against her through means
constituting persecution upon her return to China. See Qin Wen Zheng
v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that “the BIA does not
abuse its discretion in crediting the State Department reports in the face
of uncorroborated anecdotal evidence to the contrary”). The State Department
explains in its May 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions
that “U.S. officials in China are not aware of the alleged official policy, at the
national or provincial levels, mandating the sterilization of one partnerCite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
5 The regulation governing the authentication of official records and public documents
in immigration proceedings at 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 (2010) does not provide the exclusive
means for authenticating documents in immigration proceedings. Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 404 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Gui Cun Liu v. Ashcroft, 372
F.3d 529, 532-33 (3d Cir. 2004). While asylum applicants cannot always reasonably
be expected to have authenticated documents from an alleged persecutor, Cao He Lin v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d at 404, the failure to attempt to prove the authenticity
of a document through this or any other means is significant. This is particularly true in a
case such as this where the applicant’s family allegedly sought out the letter from the
authorities on the applicant’s behalf. The document is not a record of a past event, such
of couples that have given birth to two children, at least one of whom was born
abroad.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t
of State, China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions 29 (May
2007) [hereinafter 2007 Profile]; see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247,
255 (BIA 2007). According to the State Department, central government
policy prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit
to abortion or sterilization. See 2007 Profile, supra, at 24.
Although acknowledging that there were “reportedly” forced sterilizations
in Fujian in 2006, the State Department observes that Consulate General
officials visiting Fujian have found that coercion through public and other
pressure has been used, but they did not find any cases of physical force
employed in connection with abortion or sterilization. Id. at 26. In interviews
with visa applicants from Fujian representing a wide cross-section of society,
Consulate General officers have noted that many violators of the one-child
policy paid fines, but they found no evidence of forced abortion or property
confiscation. Id. at 24-25. According to the Fujian Provincial Birth Planning
Committee, there have been no cases of forced abortion or sterilization
in Fujian in the last 10 years. Id. at 24. We find these observations in the
State Department reports to be highly probative and reliable evidence of
country conditions in Fujian Province. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 471 F.3d at 341-42.
While the respondent has submitted numerous internet and newspaper
articles regarding general country conditions and the population control
policies in China, this evidence does not establish a policy of forced
sterilization of parents who return to China with children who were born
outside of that country. See Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N Dec. at 190. The
documents obtained for the respondent from the Hai Xin Street Resident
Committee of Huang Qi Town and from the Tong Xin Villager Committee of
An Kai Township, both of Lian Jiang County, are entitled to minimal weight.
These documents, which were obtained for the purpose of the hearing, are
unsigned and unauthenticated and fail to even identify the authors.5
See, e.g.,Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
as a contemporaneously created police report, but is instead a statement from local
government officials of what allegedly will happen to the respondent and her husband in the
future if they return. Cf. Matter of Pineda, 20 I&N Dec. 70, 73 (BIA 1989) (stating that
documentary evidence that was created contemporaneous with the events in question is more
persuasive than a document that is obtained to provide evidence for an immigration hearing).
Song Wang v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 615, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that it was
proper to afford little weight to a certificate from the applicant’s village
committee stating that he must be sterilized upon return to China on account
of his two United States-born children because the certificate was
unauthenticated and obtained for the purpose of the hearing); Qin Wen
Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d at 149 (finding that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in declining to credit a document purportedly sent by local
government officials that required the alien to surrender to authorities where
the document was questionable on its face and was supported only by
a spouse’s affidavit). Neither document specifies the penalties for refusing
to undergo sterilization following the birth of a second child. Further, the
State Department’s 2007 Profile contains a translation of an October 13, 2006,
letter from the Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Commission
stating that Village Committees are autonomous organizations composed
of villagers, which are not authorized to make any decisions pertaining
to family planning issues, and that a certificate issued by such a committee
should be deemed ineffective. 2007 Profile, supra, app. C, at 61.
Moreover, the letters from relatives and friends submitted by the
respondent do not provide substantial support for her contention that she will
be subjected to forcible sterilization or sanctions rising to the level
of persecution. The authors of the letters are interested witnesses who were
not subject to cross-examination. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d
at 160-61, 165; Gandziami-Mickhuo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 358-59 (4th
Cir. 2006); Xia Yue Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2005). Even
if we accept that the policy in the town to which the respondent intends
to return generally calls for sterilization after the birth of two children, the
respondent has not established that the treatment she may face if she refuses
sterilization would amount to persecution.
The letters from the respondent’s uncle and friends report sterilizations that
took place several years earlier, from February 1990 to December 2003, and
are therefore not current. Cf. Matter of C-C-, 23 I&N Dec. at 902 (finding
more persuasive the current State Department documents on country
conditions, which conflicted with an expert witness’ affidavit that was based
on information received years earlier). Also, the letters are devoid of anyCite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
detail that would establish that the type and level of “force” used by the
authorities was sufficient to constitute a persecutory act. See Xiu Fen Xia
v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N
Dec. 163, 169-70 (BIA 2007)). An April 17, 2007, Report of Investigation
by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
indicates that Chinese nationals who have not obtained permanent or long term
residence overseas, or who did not have resident visas for 3 or more years, will
be “sanctioned in compliance with the relevant family planning rules and
regulations upon returning to mainland China if they have conducted any birth
acts in violation of the family planning regulations enforced at the local
administrative level with jurisdiction over their residence of household
registration in China.” However, the report also states that Fujian Province has
introduced more than three contraceptive methods to women of childbearing
age and that family planning service institutions can provide other appropriate
methods to women who are unwilling to use an IUD or undergo sterilization
or for whom these methods are not suitable. The requirement to use an IUD
and to receive periodic medical examinations would not constitute persecution
to the respondent. Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 633, 640 (BIA
2008); see also Xia Fan Huang v. Holder, 591 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010).
Additionally, the letters do not show that the individuals referenced are
similarly situated to the respondent. See Fen Gui Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981,
989 (9th Cir. 2009). None of the individuals who provided letters for the
respondent claims to have given birth to children in the United States or
to know of anyone who has been forcibly sterilized or otherwise subjected to
sanctions rising to the level of persecution after having given birth in the
United States. In fact, the respondent has not presented any evidence
of a Chinese national who has been subjected to forcible sterilization
or sanctions rising to the level of persecution after returning to China with two
United States citizen children. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d at 164
(finding it significant that the asylum applicants were unable to point
to evidence of any person being forcibly sterilized on removal to China based
on having two children).
The State Department’s 2007 Profile indicates that an economic penalty
in the form of a social compensation fee may be imposed upon a birth planning
violator. See 2007 Profile, supra, at 27. However, the respondent has not met
her burden of establishing that payment of such a fee would put her at such
a “severe economic disadvantage” that it would amount to persecution.
Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. at 173. The 2007 Profile indicates that there
is wide variation in the amount of social compensation fees and the severity
of hardship they impose for out-of-plan births. It also notes that couples
unable to pay the fee immediately may be allowed to pay in installments. 2007
Profile, supra, at 27. The respondent has not shown that she and her husband,Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
6 We note that the USCIS Report of Investigation also refers to the October 13, 2006, letter
from the Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Commission and contains
a translation of the letter as an exhibit appended to the report.
who have lived in the United States for 7 and 10 years, respectively, would be
unable to pay a social compensation fee or that its imposition would put them
at a severe economic disadvantage. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2002).
The respondent has not shown a well-founded fear of persecution for
violation of the family planning policy even if she should enter her children
into the household registry following her return to China. However, the record
does not establish that the respondent would be constrained to enter her two
United States citizen children into the household registry. The October 13,
2006, letter from the Fujian Province Population and Family Planning
Commission indicates that children born in the United States to a Chinese
national will not be counted against the number of children allowed under
China’s family planning laws if they are not registered as permanent residents.
See 2007 Profile, supra, app. C, at 61.6
In this regard, the USCIS Report
of Investigation states that “[a]ccording to the regulations from the competent
department of China, any children of Chinese mainland residents who are born
in the U.S. are not considered as Chinese mainland residents if they have not
gone through the formalities to become Chinese mainland residents” and that
such “children who were born abroad will not be counted into the numbers
of children the Chinese mainland residents are entitled to have.” See also id.
The State Department’s 2007 Profile indicates that children without
a Chinese household registration (i.e., those who enter and live in China
as American citizens rather than as Chinese permanent residents) are not
eligible for free public education and other social benefits available to Chinese
permanent residents. Id. at 30. However, these benefits are available at
a higher cost, and many United States citizen children in China attend private
schools where their parents pay tuition. The respondent has not shown that
having to pay for the education and other social benefits for her two United
States citizen children would constitute such a “severe economic
disadvantage” that it would amount to persecution. Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N
Dec. at 173; see also Matter of Y-T-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 601, 606 (BIA 2003).
The evidence presented by the respondent does not establish a reasonable
possibility that she would be subject to forced sterilization or would face any
penalties or sanctions so severe that they would rise to the level of persecution.
This is true even if the respondent should place her children in the household
registry following her return to China so that they are included within the
number of children allowed under the Chinese family planning policy. 2007
Profile, supra, at 30. The 2007 Profile indicates that such registration couldCite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676
trigger sanctions and economic penalties under the relevant laws and
regulations and that the parents would be expected to conform to the restriction
in Chinese law and regulations on future offspring. Id. However, the
respondent has not established that any such consequences would rise to the
level of physical force or other means that would amount to persecution. See
Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N Dec. at 191-94. On balance, the evidence indicates
that physical coercion to achieve compliance with family planning goals
is uncommon and unsanctioned by China’s national laws and that the overall
policy is much more heavily reliant on incentives and economic penalties. See
id. at 191 (“Enforcement efforts resulting in moderate economic impact would
not, in general, prove a well-founded fear of future persecution.”); see also
Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. at 200-01. Further, the respondent has not
shown that her locality represents a current exception to the general rules
in which the Chinese Government relies on a variety of measures short
of persecution to enforce its population control policy.
The respondent has not shown that she has a well-founded fear of being
subjected to forcible sterilization, or other sanctions rising to the level
of persecution, if she is returned to China. She has therefore failed to establish
her eligibility for asylum. Because the respondent has not satisfied the lower
burden of proof for asylum, it follows that she has not met the higher burden
for withholding of removal. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169,
183 (2d Cir. 2004). Additionally, the record does not reflect that the
respondent presented any testimony or evidence or made any arguments before
the Immigration Judge establishing her eligibility for protection under the
Convention Against Torture. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16, 1208.18 (2010). See
generally Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006). Accordingly, the
DHS’s appeal is sustained.
ORDER: The appeal of the Department of Homeland Security
FURTHER ORDER: The order of the Immigration Judge granting
asylum is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondents are ordered removed from the
United States to China.
Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3676