Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
1 We acknowledge and appreciate the very helpful briefs submitted by the parties and
by amicus curiae, representing the American Immigration Law Foundation.
103
Matter of Maria C. YAURI, Respondent
File A071 610 438 – Los Angeles, California
Decided October 28, 2009
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) With a narrow exception not applicable to this case, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate an arriving
alien’s application for adjustment of status under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1) (2009) and agrees
that it retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the application even where an unexecuted
administratively final order of removal remains outstanding.
(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals generally lacks authority to reopen the proceedings
of aliens under final orders of exclusion, deportation, or removal who seek to pursue relief
over which the Board and the Immigration Judges have no jurisdiction, especially where
reopening is sought simply as a mechanism to stay the final order while the collateral
matter is resolved by the agency or court having jurisdiction to do so.
(3) With regard to untimely or number-barred motions to reopen, the Board will not
generally exercise its discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte for an arriving alien
to pursue adjustment of status before the USCIS.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart I. Folinsky, Esquire, Los Angeles, California
AMICUS CURIAE:1
Mary A. Kenney, Esquire, Washington, D.C.
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: James M. Left, Senior Attorney
BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES and HESS, Board Members; KENDALL CLARK,
Temporary Board Member.
HOLMES, Board Member:
This matter was last before the Board on December 2, 2003, when
we entered the final administrative order in these removal proceedings,
dismissing the respondent’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s April 30,
2002, decision. On March 24, 2008, over 4 years after that final order, theCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
104
respondent filed an untimely motion to reopen to pursue an application for
adjustment of status. With certain exceptions not applicable to the
respondent’s motion, a motion to reopen in any case previously the subject
of a final decision by the Board must be filed no later than 90 days after the
date of that decision. Section 240(c)(7)(C)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)
(2009). The respondent’s motion is therefore untimely. The Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed an opposition to the motion to reopen.
The respondent concedes that her motion is untimely, but she nevertheless
urges that sua sponte reopening by the Board is warranted because
of a change of law and because exceptional circumstances are present in her
case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132
(BIA 1999); Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997). She acknowledges
that she is an “arriving alien” who must pursue her application for adjustment
of status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), an agency within the DHS. However, she contends that the 2006
regulatory changes affecting this group of adjustment applicants and the
USCIS’s rejection of her adjustment application necessitate the reopening
of the removal proceedings against her. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 1001.1(q) (2009)
(defining the term “arriving alien”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1) (setting forth the
jurisdiction of the USCIS over adjustment applications for arriving
aliens), 1245.2(a)(1)(ii) (2009) (setting forth the limited circumstances
in which an Immigration Judge will have jurisdiction over the adjustment
application of an arriving alien); see also Eligibility of Arriving Aliens
in Removal Proceedings To Apply for Adjustment of Status and Jurisdiction
To Adjudicate Applications for Adjustment of Status, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,585-92
(May 12, 2006) (interim rule implementing changes to the regulations and
providing a process through which arriving aliens may apply for adjustment
of status). She argues that we should reopen her removal proceedings and
continue them indefinitely so that she does not have an outstanding order
of removal pending against her while she pursues her application before the
USCIS.
On June 1, 2009, after the submission of supplemental briefs in this matter,
and after the issues raised in the respondent’s motion had been considered
by the Board, the DHS filed a separate motion to reopen and terminate these
removal proceedings on the basis that the USCIS had adjudicated the
respondent’s adjustment of status application and had granted that application
on February 25, 2009. We will address this separate motion later in this
decision, but first we will adjudicate the respondent’s pending motion
to reopen. The grant of lawful permanent resident status to the respondent
does not obviate the need for the Board to provide guidance to the Immigration
Judges, the parties, and the general public with regard to recurring issuesCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
2 The parties have raised various arguments regarding the applicability of the Board’s
decision in Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), to the respondent’s case.
However, Velarde involved a timely motion to reopen before the Board, and that decision
listed the timely filing of a motion as the first criterion for the reasoning of that decision
to apply. Id. at 256. The respondent’s motion is not timely. Moreover, the principles set
forth in Velarde relate only to unadjudicated marriage-based visa petitions, whereas the visa
petition at issue in this case was filed on the respondent’s behalf by her United States citizen
daughter. Thus, Velarde has no applicability to the respondent’s case.
105
presented in her motion, which otherwise are often overcome by events before
they can be separately addressed.
I.
As a preliminary matter, aside from motions to reconsider, motions
before the Board fall into three broad categories: (1) motions to remand that
are filed in the course of ongoing, “open” proceedings before the Board;
(2) motions to reopen proceedings that satisfy the time and number
requirements set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); and (3) motions that do not
meet the time and number requirements imposed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
See also sections 240(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) of the Act. Each category of motion has
its own separate requirements that must be satisfied to allow or warrant
reopening. We note this at the outset because it is not unusual for these
separate filing requirements to be inadequately addressed or simply overlooked
in motions pending before the Board, and perhaps at times not adequately
addressed in the adjudication of the motion by the Board.
Where motions do not meet the filing requirements of 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(2) and do not qualify for a statutory or regulatory exception
to those requirements, proceedings can only be reopened under the Board’s
sua sponte authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We emphasize that untimely
motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status, even for
cases that do not involve an “arriving alien,” do not fall within any of the
statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen
before the Board and will ordinarily be denied.2
Sections 240(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv)
of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The only applications for adjustment
of status that are specifically excepted from the motion time limits are
those that involve a self-petition by a battered spouse, child, or parent
of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Section
240(c)(7)(C)(iv) of the Act. The respondent does not assert that she falls
within this exception, or any other exception to the time limits, and her motion
reflects that the visa petition was filed on her behalf by her United StatesCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
106
citizen daughter in July 2007, over 3½ years after the Board’s final order
in this case. The respondent’s motion to reopen therefore turns on whether
sua sponte reopening is warranted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also Matter
of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132; Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976.
II.
We also find it necessary to address whether the Board or the Immigration
Judge has jurisdiction over the respondent’s underlying adjustment application
and, if not, whether the USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate the adjustment
application of an arriving alien who is under a final order of removal. This
question arises in the context of regulations promulgated in May 2006, which
repealed an earlier regulation that barred “arriving aliens” from applying for
adjustment of status and conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the USCIS
to adjudicate adjustment applications filed by arriving aliens, with the
limited exception of adjustment applications filed by arriving aliens who
had been paroled into the United States to pursue a previously filed
adjustment application. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1), 1245.2(a)(1)(ii); 71 Fed. Reg.
at 27,591-92. The respondent does not contend that she falls within the limited
exception under which the Immigration Judge would have jurisdiction over her
adjustment application, and the record reflects that she was not paroled into the
United States to pursue a previously filed adjustment application. She did,
however, present evidence that the USCIS rejected the adjustment application
that she had filed in July 2007. The USCIS rejected the application because
a warrant of deportation had been issued against the respondent in 2004, and
she was therefore under removal proceedings before the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, of which the Board is the ultimate decision-making
body.
Given the apparent confusion regarding the USCIS’s jurisdiction under the
regulations to adjudicate the respondent’s adjustment application, the Board
requested supplemental briefing by the parties to specifically address this
question. The parties provided supplemental briefing, and a brief was also
filed on the respondent’s behalf by amicus curiae. In these briefs, the
parties have stated their agreement that, under the regulations promulgated
on May 12, 2006, jurisdiction over the respondent’s adjustment application lies
with the USCIS, and not with the Immigration Judge or the Board. Moreover,
the DHS has stated that it recognizes that the USCIS’s jurisdiction over the
adjustment application of an arriving alien exists regardless of whether there
is an unexecuted removal order that remains outstanding against the alien.
In the amicus brief filed by counsel from the American Immigration Law
Foundation, USCIS jurisdiction over such applications was acknowledged.
It was also acknowledged that most local offices of the USCIS recognizeCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
107
their jurisdiction or, in cases where they initially failed to do so, the issue
of jurisdiction was resolved once the regulations were brought to that office’s
attention.
Upon consideration of the supplemental briefs, we find no dispute over the
question of which agency has jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent’s
adjustment of status application. Jurisdiction lies with the USCIS under the
applicable regulations, because the respondent is an arriving alien who does
not fall within the limited exception that would confer jurisdiction over the
application on the Immigration Judge or the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1).
Moreover, we emphasize that the existence of a final order of removal does not
preclude the USCIS from granting adjustment of status to an arriving alien
who is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status.
III.
Given that the Board has no jurisdiction over the underlying application,
the question arises whether we can or should reopen proceedings in which
a final administrative order has been entered while such an application
is being pursued before the USCIS. We have long been of the view that
administratively final exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings should
not be reopened for matters over which neither the Immigration Judge nor the
Board has jurisdiction, and that referencing the absence of such jurisdiction
was a rational basis in itself to decline to reopen proceedings. See, e.g., Matter
of Castro, 21 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 1996) (declining to reopen exclusion
proceedings for adjustment of status where the Immigration Judge did not have
jurisdiction in exclusion proceedings over an adjustment of status application
under the applicable regulations). Nevertheless, some courts of appeals
have recently remanded cases in which the Board denied motions solely
on the basis of the lack of jurisdiction over the underlying applications. See,
e.g., Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2008); Sheng Gao Ni v. Bd.
of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2008); Potdar v. Keisler,
505 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2007), rev’d on reh’g sub nom. Potdar v. Mukasey,
550 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008).
In Sheng Gao Ni v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d at 130, for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that
the “likely purpose” of a such an adjustment of status motion filed in removal
proceedings “was to permit petitioners to press their adjustment applications
before the USCIS without remaining subject to final orders of removal.” The
court ruled that a “rote recital of a jurisdictional statement—even if technically
accurate—does not adequately discharge the BIA’s duty to ‘consider the facts
of record relevant to the motion’ and provide a ‘rational explanation’ for itsCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
3 The Ninth Circuit, in which this case arises, held in Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d
at 1217-18, that the Board abused its discretion in denying “solely on jurisdictional grounds”
an arriving alien’s motion to reopen to seek adjustment of status. In our decision, we had
determined that reopening and a remand were unwarranted because jurisdiction over any
adjustment application that the alien might file resided exclusively with the USCIS.
However, we had not discussed whether reopening could or should be granted in order
to “stay” the alien’s removal while the USCIS resolved his adjustment application on its
merits. Consequently, we do not view the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent reversal as foreclosing
us from now engaging in an examination of the extent of our authority to effectuate a “stay”
through the reopening of proceedings, although we acknowledge and will herein address the
court’s above-cited expression of concern about the potential ramifications of denying
reopening under such circumstances. Additionally, Kalilu involved a timely motion
to reopen (indeed, the motion apparently had been filed during the pendency of a Board
appeal and therefore was actually a pre-final-order motion to remand), as well
as circumstances that the court found to be governed by Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec.
253. Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1218. In contrast, in this case the respondent’s motion
to reopen was untimely (as further discussed infra), and Velarde is inapposite. See supra
note 2.
108
ruling.” Id. at 129-30 (quoting Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 50 (2d
Cir. 2008)). It remanded the case for the Board to reconsider the issue and
provide adequate reasons for denying the motion.
In Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1218, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the opportunity that the new regulation affords for an arriving alien
in removal proceedings to establish his eligibility for adjustment of status
“is rendered worthless where the BIA . . . denies a motion to reopen . . . that
is sought in order to provide time for USCIS to adjudicate a pending
application.” The Ninth Circuit further opined that, without reopening,
an alien with a prima facie valid Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130)
or an adjustment application pending before the USCIS could be removed and,
if removed, his or her adjustment application would be deemed abandoned.
Id.
Given these decisions, we will attempt to more fully explain our general
position regarding motions to reopen proceedings that involve applications for
relief or other matters over which neither the Board nor the Immigration Judge
has jurisdiction.
To the extent that these decisions from the circuit courts can be read
to address respondents who are under administratively final orders of removal,
the decisions appear to indicate that the Board should be considering whether
our proceedings should be used as a vehicle, in effect, to “stay” execution
of the administratively final order of exclusion, deportation, or removal while
the arriving alien’s adjustment application is resolved by the USCIS.3
This
presents the question whether the Board can or should exercise its discretionCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
4 In our view, whether phrased in terms of “staying” removal, or “lifting” an order
of removal, or reopening the proceedings to provide time for the USCIS to adjudicate
a pending application without the alien “being subject to a final order of removal,” the actual
remedy sought is a stay of removal pending adjudication of an application by the USCIS.
See, e.g., Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215; Sheng Gao Ni v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals,
520 F.3d 125; Potdar v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 680.
5 In this instance, jurisdiction over the matter at issue is with the USCIS. However, parties
could raise similar arguments with regard to matters pending in other forums.
6 In its supplemental brief, the DHS outlines the process for obtaining a stay of the final
removal order, as well as the process for obtaining deferred enforcement of the outstanding
removal order. The DHS also points out that the respondent did not present any evidence
(continued…)
109
to reopen proceedings to effectively grant such a “stay” of a final order while
the alien pursues an independent adjustment of status application with the
USCIS.4
We do not view the Board’s authority to consider stays of execution of final
orders, which we have been granted under Federal regulations, to extend this
far. In particular, we have been granted limited stay authority under the
regulations, which is almost exclusively tied to pending motions before the
Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f). Under that authority, if there is no automatic
stay under the regulations, we may determine whether to grant a stay
of execution of the final deportation or removal order while we consider the
motion that is pending before us. Id. Likewise, an Immigration Judge also has
authority to stay execution of a final order while a motion is pending before
the Immigration Court. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(v) (2009). The stay
authority granted to the Board and Immigration Judges does not provide
general authority to grant stays of administratively final orders in conjunction
with matters over which we have no authority. Rather, the limited stay
authority provides the opportunity to stay proceedings while a pending motion
is adjudicated. That stay authority also terminates upon adjudication of the
pending motion.
It is our understanding of the law that if an alien under a final order
of exclusion, deportation, or removal is seeking some form of relief from
a third party5
over which the Immigration Judges and the Board lack
jurisdiction, the question whether the alien is either entitled to a stay
of removal or warrants a stay as a matter of discretion while such application
or request is pending is not within our jurisdiction. Any stay request should
go to the agency or court that does have jurisdiction over the matter. In this
case, the parties agree that the USCIS has jurisdiction over the respondent’s
adjustment application, and her request for a stay should therefore go to the
DHS. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6(a), 1241.6(a) (2009).6
If an arriving alien underCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
(…continued)
that she attempted to request a stay from the DHS, or that such a request was denied by that
agency.
7 The respondent also urges that the Board should reopen proceedings sua sponte based
on a change in law. Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132. However, because we do not find
that the change at issue here, i.e., the 2006 regulations, conferred jurisdiction over the
underlying application on the Board, this argument is not persuasive.
110
a final order of removal has the right to remain in the United States to pursue
an adjustment application, proceedings should not need to be reopened
to protect it. On the other hand, if the alien does not have such a right, then the
discretion to allow him or her to remain in the United States until the
application is adjudicated lies, if at all, with the agency or court having
jurisdiction over the application, here the DHS. The DHS also has its separate
authority to grant a respondent deferred action in the exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion, which is not subject to review by the Board or the
Immigration Judges. See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 349, 349-50 (BIA
1982); see also Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.3 (9th Cir.
2001); Matter of Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 427, 433 (BIA 1996).
Accordingly, we conclude that we have not been granted authority to reopen
the proceedings of respondents who are under a final administrative order
of removal to pursue matters that could affect their removability if we have
no jurisdiction over such matters. This is especially so where reopening
is sought simply as a mechanism to stay a final order of removal while the
collateral matter is being resolved.
IV.
Finally, and separately from any question of jurisdiction, with regard
to untimely or number-barred motions to reopen, we conclude that sua sponte
reopening of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings pending a third
party’s adjudication of an underlying application that is not itself within our
jurisdiction ordinarily would not be warranted as a matter of discretion.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132; Matter
of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976.7
As a practical matter, Immigration Judges and the Board have limited and
finite adjudicative and administrative resources, and those resources are best
allocated to matters over which we do have jurisdiction. Among the
costs of reopening final proceedings in cases such as the one before us,
where we have no jurisdiction over the underlying relief requested, are
the practical and administrative difficulties associated with maintaining open
cases that would rely on outside considerations and would become partCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
8 The “practical” concerns in ongoing proceedings that have not become final are
fundamentally different. There can be sound reasons to continue or administratively close
proceedings while matters outside the Immigration Judge’s jurisdiction are resolved, often
including reasons directly related to administrative efficiency and the best utilization
of adjudicative resources. See, e.g., Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009) (setting
forth considerations for granting a continuance when a family-based visa petition is pending
before the USCIS). Further, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security
have solicited comments “on the standards for the granting of continuances to arriving aliens
in removal proceedings while applications for adjustment of status are pending with USCIS.”
71 Fed. Reg. at 27,589 (Supplementary Information). Thus, while we acknowledge the
arguments raised surrounding the question whether proceedings can or should be continued
when an arriving alien’s adjustment application is pending with the USCIS, our decision
in this case does not resolve that issue. Different considerations also may arise in the context
of joint motions to reopen, where the parties are in agreement that the time limits should not
apply to the motion to reopen and that proceedings should be reopened for agreed-upon
purposes. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).
111
of already-crowded dockets. Immigration Judges, for example, would
be required to schedule and oversee matters over which they play
no substantive role, because the cases would once again be on their docket.
If the application is ultimately denied, the Immigration Judge is placed in the
position of having to enter a further order or decision that simply sets forth
information provided by others, assuming such information is actually
provided to the Immigration Judge in a timely manner. There would
be nothing to preclude the respondent from filing an appeal to the Board from
such an order, unnecessarily adding to our pending case load, and despite the
fact that we would have no review authority over aspects of that decision.
When the matters are ones over which the Board and the Immigration
Judges actually do have jurisdiction, these are simply the necessary “costs”
of an adjudication system. But such is not the case if we are obliged to reopen
proceedings while third parties resolve matters over which we have no direct
or review authority.8
Given our lack of jurisdiction over this category
of adjustment applications, and because a process exists for requesting a stay
from the DHS, the administrative and practical costs of reopening weigh
heavily in our discretionary analysis. Thus, we will generally decline
to exercise our discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte under such
circumstances. Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. at 1133-34 (recognizing that
sua sponte authority is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional
circumstances”); see also Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976.
In sum, we conclude that we generally lack authority to reopen final
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings where an alien seeks to pursue
relief over which neither the Board nor the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction.
In addition, we find that the stay authority we have been granted by regulationCite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
112
does not extend to granting reopening of proceedings in order to effectively
grant a “stay” of an outstanding final order of exclusion, deportation,
or removal while a matter over which we lack jurisdiction is resolved. Finally,
we will not generally exercise our discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte
for an arriving alien to pursue an adjustment of status application before the
USCIS. To do otherwise would place an arriving alien who files an untimely
motion to reopen proceedings in a more favorable position than any other alien
who files an untimely motion seeking adjustment of status and does not
otherwise qualify for an exception to the time limits imposed on motions
to reopen.
In this case, the respondent has presented no exceptional circumstances, and
her motion does not persuade us to sua sponte reopen these proceedings, which
have been administratively final since December 2003, in order for her
to pursue her application for adjustment before the USCIS. Matter of J-J-,
21 I&N Dec. 976. The respondent’s motion will therefore be denied
as untimely filed.
V.
Having resolved the issues raised in the respondent’s motion to reopen,
we turn, as a final matter, to the DHS’s motion to reopen and terminate these
removal proceedings based on the USCIS’s grant of lawful permanent resident
status to the respondent on February 25, 2009.
As we noted earlier, it is not necessary to reopen or terminate proceedings
in order to allow an alien to pursue an application for adjustment of status
before the USCIS. The fact that the USCIS has, in fact, completed its
adjudication of the respondent’s adjustment application—despite initially
rejecting that application—and granted the respondent lawful permanent status
while her motion was pending with the Board merely reinforces our
determination that sua sponte reopening is not generally warranted. There
is no indication that the DHS attempted to execute the removal order during
that period of adjudication. However, the respondent could have sought a stay
of her final removal order from the DHS, if it had been necessary.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6(a), 1241.6(a). The respondent’s adjustment application
has been processed as envisioned under the new regulations without resorting
to reopening and “staying” the removal proceedings, and she has been granted
the status for which she applied with the USCIS. Given these circumstances,
reopening solely for termination of the proceedings is warranted and we will
grant the DHS’s motion.Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659
113
ORDER: The respondent’s motion to reopen is denied.
FURTHER ORDER: The motion of the Department of Homeland
Security to reopen and terminate is granted, and these removal proceedings are
terminated.