Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 360 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3808
360
Matter of M-L-M-A-, Respondent
Decided as amended August 5, 20141
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) Because an application for special rule cancellation of removal under section
240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2006), is a
continuing one, false testimony given by the respondent more than 3 years prior to the
entry of a final administrative order should not be considered in determining whether
she is barred from establishing good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2006). Matter of Garcia, 24 I&N Dec. 179 (BIA 2007), and
Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005), followed.
(2) Although the respondent was divorced from her abusive husband and subsequently
had a long-term relationship with another man, she had not previously been granted
special rule cancellation of removal based on her abusive marriage and had significant
equities that merited a favorable exercise of discretion. Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec.
66 (BIA 2009), distinguished.
FOR RESPONDENT: Kelli J. Stump, Esquire, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
BEFORE: Board Panel: PAULEY, COLE, and WENDTLAND, Board Members.
PAULEY, Board Member:
This case was last before the Board on September 9, 2011. At that time,
we remanded the record to the Immigration Judge for further consideration
of the respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal
under section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2) (2006), a form of relief reserved for certain victims of
domestic violence in accordance with the provisions of the Violence of
Against Women Act, enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1786, 1902
(“VAWA”). Specifically, we asked the Immigration Judge to clarify his
finding that the respondent lacked good moral character during the requisite
statutory period, as required by section 240A(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act and
defined by section 101(f) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2006).

1 We designate our January 13, 2014, order in this case as a precedent. This amended
order makes editorial changes consistent with our designation of the case as precedent.Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 360 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3808
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In his decision on remand dated October 25, 2012, the Immigration
Judge reaffirmed his prior denial of the respondent’s application based on
his conclusion that she did not establish the requisite good moral character
or merit relief in the exercise of discretion. The respondent, a native and
citizen of Mexico, has appealed from that decision. The Department
of Homeland Security has not filed any opposition to the appeal. The
respondent’s request for oral argument is denied pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(7) (2013). The appeal will be sustained and the record will be
remanded to the Immigration Judge.
The issues before us are (1) whether the respondent has been a person
of good moral character during the requisite statutory period pursuant
to section 240A(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act and (2) whether she merits relief
in the exercise of discretion.
In his initial decision on March 2, 2010, the Immigration Judge made an
adverse credibility finding with respect to the respondent’s testimony,
concluding that she had not been truthful about the identities of the
individuals with whom she entered the United States. Specifically, the
respondent testified that she entered the United States with another man and
woman who were not related to her and that she was not accompanied by
any family members. However, her father testified that she entered the
United States with him, her five siblings, and either one other man or a man
and a woman, both of whom were unrelated to the family. Relying on this
discrepancy, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent gave false
testimony at her hearing. Based on that finding and the fact that in 1997,
the respondent filed a fraudulent asylum application to obtain employment
authorization when she was not, in fact, eligible for this benefit, the
Immigration Judge held that she was precluded under section 101(f)(6)
of the Act from establishing good moral character and was therefore
statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.
On remand, the Immigration Judge clarified that the respondent’s false
testimony was not made with the subjective intent to obtain a benefit under
the Act and was therefore not a basis to find her barred from establishing
good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Act. However, he
reaffirmed his previous finding in that regard based on the respondent’s
fraudulent asylum application, which she filed to obtain employment
authorization.
The Immigration Judge also reaffirmed his determination that the
respondent’s request for relief should be denied in the exercise of discretion.
In addition to the above negative considerations, he relied on the
respondent’s 2001 divorce from her abusive husband and her subsequent
long-term relationship with another man, with whom she had three children.
See Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66, 77–78 (BIA 2009) (finding that an Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 360 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3808
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alien’s divorce from an abusive spouse, remarriage, and previous
self-petition for relief based on the abusive marriage are relevant factors in
determining whether an application for special rule cancellation of removal
under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act should be granted in the exercise
of discretion). Finding that these were significant adverse factors, the
Immigration Judge determined that they outweighed the respondent’s
equities.
The respondent first contends that the Immigration Judge erred in
making an adverse credibility finding. Assuming that he relied on the
adverse credibility finding and her 1997 asylum application in concluding
that she lacked good moral character, the respondent asserts that this
determination was also in error, although she maintains that the
Immigration Judge did not adequately explain his decision in this respect.
Moreover, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in
finding that she does not merit relief in the exercise of discretion.
Specifically, she asserts that he did not fully consider all of the relevant
equities in her case or adequately address the differences between her case
and the facts in Matter of A-M-. Finally, she asserts that she was denied a
fair hearing during the course of remanded proceedings. We will address
each argument in turn.
We first note that under section 101(d) of the REAL ID Act of 2005,
Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 304, an adverse credibility
finding may be based on internal inconsistencies within the respondent’s
testimony or inconsistencies between her testimony and that provided
by other witnesses. 2
See section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2012); see also Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 538
(5th Cir. 2009) (holding that any inconsistency may be relied on to support
an adverse credibility finding under the REAL ID Act so long as the lack
of credibility is established by the totality of the circumstances (citing
Xiu Xiu Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008))).
The Immigration Judge based his adverse credibility finding on
discrepancies between the respondent’s testimony and that provided by
her father relating to the identities of the individuals who entered
the United States with her. We discern no clear error in the Immigration
Judge’s adverse credibility determination because it is supported by the
record, as well as specific and cogent reasons for his finding. See Wang
v. Holder, 569 F.3d at 538; Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344–45

2 Because the respondent filed her application for special rule cancellation of removal
after May 11, 2005, the provisions of the REAL ID Act apply to her case. See REAL ID
Act of 2005 § 101(h)(2), 119 Stat. at 305; Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42, 44–45
(BIA 2006).Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 360 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3808
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(5th Cir. 2005); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(i). Accordingly, we decline
to disturb the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination.
Turning to the issue of good moral character, we agree with the
respondent that in order to give rise to a statutory bar, any relevant
considerations generally must fall within the 3-year period preceding the
entry of a final administrative order. See section 240A(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the
Act (establishing the 3-year good moral character period); Matter of Garcia,
24 I&N Dec. 179, 182–83 (BIA 2007) (explaining that an application for
special rule cancellation of removal is a continuing one and that the good
moral character period, which is coterminous with the period of continuous
physical presence, accrues until the entry of a final administrative order);
Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793, 797–98 (BIA 2005) (stating
that the period of good moral character is calculated backward from the
date of the final administrative decision).
Because the filing of the respondent’s 1997 asylum application fell
outside the 3-year period, we need not consider whether that application
would otherwise prevent her from establishing good moral character under
section 101(f)(6) of the Act. Moreover, since the Immigration Judge
determined on remand that the respondent’s false testimony regarding her
entry was not given for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit,
there are no identified statutory bars to a favorable good moral character
determination. See sections 101(f)(6), 240A(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act.
Assuming that the adverse credibility finding and the respondent’s
fraudulent asylum application are relevant to whether the “catchall”
provision at section 101(f) is triggered, we conclude that these factors alone
are not so significant as to prevent the respondent from meeting her burden
of proof in establishing good moral character.
With respect to the issue of discretion, we recognize that the respondent
has the following significant equities: (1) her residence in the United States
for more than 20 years; (2) her family ties in this country, including her six
United States citizen children and lawful permanent resident parents;
(3) the hardship that the respondent, her children, and her parents would
experience should she be removed from the United States; (4) the absence
of any criminal record; and (5) the fact that she has never worked in
the United States without authorization. As relevant negative factors,
the Immigration Judge properly considered the adverse credibility
determination and the respondent’s fraudulent asylum application, which
was filed in 1997 in an attempt to obtain employment authorization. He
also relied on Matter of A-M- in heavily weighing the respondent’s 2001
divorce from her abusive husband and her long-term relationship with
another man as adverse factors.Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 360 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3808
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The respondent argues that the long-past ending of her abusive
relationship is not a relevant factor in the discretionary analysis. We
disagree because a purpose of VAWA relief is to empower aliens to leave
abusive relationships. See Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. at 77–78.
However, we do agree that the respondent’s case is distinguishable from
Matter of A-M-, where we denied special rule cancellation of removal in the
exercise of discretion because, among other things, the respondent had
previously obtained her lawful permanent residence through a VAWA
provision. Id. at 78. We held that the VAWA provisions “should not be
invoked again to benefit an alien when the past abusive relationship has
ended and the former abusive spouse no longer poses a threat.” Id.
(emphasis added).
Although the respondent is no longer in the abusive relationship, she has
not previously received VAWA relief, nor does she have any other
currently available means of regularizing her status. Despite the fact that
her divorce from her abusive husband and her subsequent long-term
relationship with another man weigh against a favorable exercise of
discretion, we conclude that the respondent’s significant equities outweigh
these and the other adverse factors presented.
Consequently, we disagree with the Immigration Judge’s determination
that the respondent is statutorily ineligible for special rule cancellation of
removal under section 240A(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act and that she does not
merit a favorable exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the respondent’s
appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for the purpose of
completing the requisite background checks. In light of our disposition in
this matter, we find it unnecessary to consider the respondent’s other
arguments on appeal.
ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(6), the record
is remanded to the Immigration Judge for the purpose of giving the
Department of Homeland Security the opportunity to complete or update
identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations, for
further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of an order as provided
by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h) (2013).